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An Anatomy of Bank Bail-ins 
Why the Eurozone Needs a Fiscal Backstop
for the Banking Sector
by Emilios Avgouleas and Charles Goodhart23
abstract
Bail-ins could prove an effective way to replace the unpopular bail-outs. In
the EU the doom-loop between bank and sovereign indebtedness lest
governments with a major conundrum. Thus, the EU resolution regime requires
the prior participation of bank creditors in meeting the costs of bank
recapitalisation before any form of public contribution is made. But, there is a
danger of over-reliance on bail-ins. Bail-in regimes will not remove the need
for public injection of funds, unless the risk is idiosyncratic. This suggestion
raises concerns for banks in the periphery of the euro-area, which present very
high levels of non-performing assets, crippling credit growth and economic
recovery. To avoid pushing Eurozone banks with high NPL levels into bail-in
centred recapitalisations, we have considered the benefits from and legal
obstacles to the possible establishment of a euro-wide fund for NPLs that would
enjoy an ESM guarantee. Long-term (capped) profit-loss sharing arrangements
could bring the operation of the fund as close to a commercial operation as
possible. Cleaning up bank balance sheets from NPLs would free up capital for
new lending boosting economic recovery in the periphery of the Eurozone. 
23. Professor (Chair) of International Banking Law and Finance, University of Edinburgh; Norman Sosnow
Professor of Banking and Finance (Emeritus, LSE).
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1. introduction
Bank bail-outs are a source of moral hazard and they undermine market
discipline. Bail-outs can also have a destabilizing impact on public finances
and sovereign debt. These concerns led to reforms meant to internalize the
costs of bank failures of which the foremost is the implementation of bank
creditor bail-in regimes. The bail-in approach constitutes a radical rethinking
of who bears the ultimate costs of the operation of the financial system and
especially of fractional reserve banking. Essentially, it replaces the public
subsidy with a private penalty or with private insurance forcing banks to
internalize the cost of the risks they assume (Avgouleas and Goodhart, 2014,
2015). This penalty is meant to force creditors to intensify bank monitoring,
thereby helping to restore market discipline and become more alert about the
levels of leverage a bank carries (Avgouleas, 2014). Creditor reaction to
prospective bail-ins may raise ex ante the cost of bank funding and limit
excessive leverage. Since shareholders have every incentive to build leverage
to maximize their return on equity (Admati et al., 2013; Avgouleas and Cullen,
2015). So, the treat of creditor bail-in should, in principle, eliminate the ‘too-
big-to-fail’ subsidy that bigger banks enjoy and the important governance
costs that are associated with excessive leverage (Admati et al., 2012;
Avgouleas and Cullen, 2014). 
In the European Union (EU), the doom-loop between bank instability and
sovereign indebtedness lest governments with a major conundrum. But instead
of using the European Stability Mechanism (ESM),24 as part of a euro-TARP-like
arrangement to offer a limited fiscal backstop to the European Banking Union
(EBU), euro area governments thought it suitable to rely on bail-ins of bank
liabilities. The EU resolution regime comprising the EU Bank Recovery and
Resolution Directive (BRRD)25 and the ESM statute,26 requires, in the absence of
private funds, the prior participation of bank creditors in meeting the costs of
bank recapitalisations before any form of public contribution is made. 
24. Intergovernmental Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, 2 February 2012, T/ESM
2012/en 2.
25. Directive 2014/59/EU establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions
and investment firms OJ L 2014 173/190 [hereinaster BRRD].
26. ‘European Stability Mechanism By-Laws’, 8 October 2012.
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What complicates such intentions is that non-performing bank assets in
the eurozone, mainly comprising Non-Performing Loans (NPLs), have
increased by more than three-fold to €928 billion as of end-September 2015
from €292 billion as of end-December 2007 (ESM, 2015, p. 42). European
banks carry this large stock of NPLs on their balance sheets – the single
largest legacy of the past crisis. NPLs are not distributed evenly across the
euro area, with banks in crisis-hit periphery countries holding more than two
thirds of the total for the euro area as a whole. In Portugal, for example, about
30% of small- and medium-sized enterprises currently have at least one loan
that is not performing (ESM, 2015, p. 42). The proportion of bank capital that
NPLs absorb rose to 8.1% of all bank lending as of end-September 2015 from
1.6% as of end-2007. At the beginning of the financial crisis, NPLs absorbed
roughly the same proportion of banks’ capital in both groups of countries
(1.6%). By end-September 2015, however, this ratio had climbed to 14% in the
peripheral countries versus a more limited 4% in the core countries (ESM,
2015, p. 42).
A large number of older and more recent research studies and reports by
international organisations suggest that the level of NPLs in the banking sector
can be important for credit extension and growth.27 Weak bank balance sheets
can act as a drag on economic activity, especially in economies that rely mainly
on bank financing like Eurozone’s. Relevant studies find that higher NPLs tend
to reduce the credit-to-GDP ratio and GDP growth, while increasing
unemployment. A recent IMF study by Aiyar et al. (2015a) has shown that this
is also consistent with data from EZ banks over the last five years. 
Aiyar et al. (2015b) have found that high NPL ratios tie up bank capital that
could otherwise be used to increase lending, reduce bank profitability, and raise
funding costs – thereby dampening credit supply.28 Reducing NPLs
expeditiously is therefore crucial to support credit growth. For this reason,
ESM’s view that sole reliance on GDP growth will not lead to a sufficiently fast
decline of NPLs carries extra weight.29 An IMF report on NPLs has noted that
27. The literature on financial dependence and growth is well-established Rajan and Zingales (1998),
Kashyap et al. (1994). Several recent studies have looked specifically at the feedback effects from NPLs to
macroeconomic performance and have reached similar conclusions. E.g., Klein (2013), Nkusu (2011), and
Espinoza and Prasad (2010). K. Bergthaler, Y Liu, D Monaghan (2015). 
28. Aiyar et al. (2015b), figure 2.
29. ESM, “Annual Report – 2015”, pp. 42-43.
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lasting recovery following a financial crisis requires bringing down NPLs. But,
while the IMF has made the ratio of NPLs key to its measurements of financial
sector strength,30 it has not explained what is an acceptable level of NPLs,
implying that the optimal ratio is as low as possible. The rationale, as may be
gauged by said IMF report is that NPLs on banks’ balance sheets create
uncertainty and weigh on their ability to resume lending, and thereby influence
aggregate demand and investment.31
The most likely source of such uncertainty extends to doubts about the
bank’s solvency itself,32 because the bank involved has not written down the
true value of the NPL assets, and the market assumes that the accounting
value of the capital that banks show on their books is overstated. Another
important factor is that NPLs reduce bank profitability, and thus, however well
a bank seems to be capitalised, a bank with very low profitability is always
assumed to be only a few steps away from trouble.33
The large stock of NPLs is an important cause of anaemic economic
activity in the Eurozone not just because of reduced lending and overhang but
also due to a persistent impression of bank fragility. Another issue is that
unresolved NPLs suppress the economic activity of overextended borrowers34
and trap resources in unproductive uses. So resolving impaired loans is
tantamount to tackling the debt overhang stimulating demand for new loans
for viable firms, while promoting the winding-down of unviable firms.35
Finally, cleaning up the bank lending channel would enhance the transmission
of monetary policy to the real economy.
The European Central Bank (ECB) has recently consulted on obstacles to NPL
restructuring and supervisory and business tools to tackle NPLs, which clearly
shows a strong intention to do so on a going concern bank basis (ECB, 2016).
But what the ECB has put to consultation is more a framework for dealing with
30. The IMF employs a “nonperforming loans net of provisions to capital” ratio as an indication of the
extent to which losses can be absorbed before the sector becomes technically insolvent. IMF (2015, Ch. 6,
para 6.15). 
31. ESM, “Annual Report – 2015”, p. 4. 2016
32. In fact, if a separate set of variables to what EBA uses for its stress tests is employed, the impression
of vulnerability is even stronger. See Acharya et al. (2016). 
33. Indicatively, Acharya et al. (2016) note that “[s]ince the start of the Banking Union in Nov. 2014,
European banks lost nearly half their market capitalization”.
34. E.g., 80% of NPLs in Italy are loans to corporates (Jassaud and Kang, 2015, p. 6). 
35. Ibid. p. 17; Aiyar et al. (2015b, p. 17). 
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new NPLs and tackling a manageable load of distressed assets through prudential
and other measures and less a radical cleaning up of legacy loans. So disincentives
to write off NPLs persist, due, inter alia, to low earlier provisioning,36 and
recapitalization and bail-in concerns are ever present given also low market
capitalisations for Eurozone banks that discourage private investment.
One possible way of overcoming the problem of legacy loans would be the
establishment of euro area Asset Management Company for NPLs. Addressing
the NPL issue implies allocating losses within the system, e.g., banks
customers, the banks, investors, or the states. However, concentration of NPL
management in an AMC can create economies of scale. Also a euro-AMC could
undertake to amortize loss over a longer period while freeing up bank balance
sheets. This method is arguably superior to other asset protection schemes
that leave NPLs on-balance sheet.
There are, however, many issues to consider before one could confidently
advocate such an institutional reform.  Some of these are the legal obstacles
(e.g., enforcement of collateral, business liquidation) and tax dis-incentives
encountered in many EU jurisdictions (e.g., Italy)37 and the intricacies of
domestic justice systems, which are widely blamed for the persistence of high
NPL ratios in the Eurozone.38 Yet many jurisdictions have made serious
progress to remove legal obstacles and have streamlined their insolvency laws
(e.g., Italy, Cyprus, Greece).39 So further harmonization of national bankruptcy
laws may not be as important as it would have been a few years ago. Moreover,
even if complete harmonization was possible remedying problems relating to
judicial process and culture would certainly be a long-term exercise. But
tackling bank legacy assets in the periphery of the Eurozone cannot wait much
longer for the aforementioned economic reasons. 
Another key obstacle a euro-AMC would face would be the form of any
public support it could enjoy to avoid a breach of the prohibition of article
125 of the Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).  We
suggest that a possible euro-AMC should utilize private arrangements for the
36. For disincentives facing bank managers to write off NPLs in Italy see Jassaud and Kang (2015, p. 11). 
37. Ibid. p. 13.
38. Aiyar et al. (2015b). 
39. E.g., at the end of 2015 Greece passed law 4354/2015 (the “NPL Law”) aiming at facilitating the sale
of NPL portfolios to non-bank companies. 
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transfer of NPLs to the AMC with losses amortized over a long-time and
accompanied by (capped) profit-loss arrangements to cover any losses the
AMC might suffer. As regards any residual final losses eurozone authorities
might wish to consider the possibility of granting the AMC an ESM guarantee.
Arguably, the closer to market terms the conditions governing the operation
of a euro-AMC the more likely that such an arrangement could pass,40 or
entirely avoid state aid restrictions.41 Moreover, if the transfer of NPLs to the
AMC becomes subject to implementation of a new business plan by selling
banks for authorities to sanction the transactions and/or a structural
conditionality to dispose of business lines and assets at commercial value to
the market, then cleaning up of NPLs may also serve as an effective remedy
to facilitate new entries to an over-concentrated sector.42
The possibility of constructing a euro-AMC to relieve banks in eurozone’s
periphery from the burden that NPLs currently pose is also supported by the
fact that the current EU resolution regime is unhelpful in fostering early
resolution of distressed loan portfolios. In general, bail-ins have their own and
largely underestimated risks. Overconfidence about the virtuous impact of
bail-in regimes was in part the result of the regulatory and intellectual
enthusiasm bail-ins have generated as an alternative to the discredited
bailouts. Also due to the fact that in the Cypus incident the deep haircut was
partly absorbed by non-EU creditors. 
But perceptions have changed since the mini-crash of European banking
stocks in January and February 2016, and even more so due to the question
marks hanging around banks beyond the Euro zone periphery. These concerns
have brought into sharp focus the feasibility of imposition of losses on general
bank creditors when there is a looming threat of a systemic crisis. They have
also revealed the behavioural implications of the threat of generalized bail-ins. 
40. See EU Commission, Press Release, “State aid: Commission gives final approval to existing guarantee
ceiling for German HSH Nordbank”, 3 May 2016. The rationale of earlier Commission decisions on the
supply of an asset protection guarantee to Nordbank by its majority shareholders, the Lander of Hamburg
and Schleswig Holstein, centered on the fact that the guarantee was offered on commercial terms. The
latest decision requires drastic asset disposals. While the decision refers to state aid offered before the
implementation of the BRRD and it is probably not the right precedent, the commercial terms language
may not be ignored.  
41. The key element of national AMC schemes to avoid state aid investigations and BRRD restrictions in the
post-BRRD era has been asset disposal at commercial value (e.g., Hungary). See Mesnard et al. (2016, p. 7). 
42. Following a wave of consolidation levels of concentration within the eurozone banking system have
gone up by four points since 2008. In countries worst hit by the crisis concentration levels range from
over 55 % (Spain) to nearly 100 % (Greece). See Garrido (2016), figure 2. 
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2. Unpacking the Bail-in process
A. Are Creditor Bail-ins a Superior Loss Absorption Mechanism? 
(i) Who Should Bear the Losses?
The scale of losses flowing from bank failures is initially independent of the
identity of those upon whom the burden of meeting that loss falls. But, such
losses can also entail critical externalities. These have traditionally justified the
use of public bail-outs to avoid the systemic threat that the failure of any bank
beyond a certain size carries with it. As mentioned earlier, the bail-in process is
based on the penalty principle, namely, that the costs of bank failures are shisted
to where they best belong: bank shareholders and creditors. But the idea that
the penalty for failure can be shisted onto an institution is incorrect. Ultimately
all penalties, and similarly benefits, have to be absorbed by individuals, not
inanimate institutions. When it is said that the bank will pay the penalty of
failure, this essentially means that the penalty is paid, in the guise of worsened
terms, by bank managers, bank staff, bank creditors, or the borrowers. The real
question is which group of individuals will be asked to absorb the cost.
(ii) Contagion risk
A desideratum for a revenue raising mechanism is that the taxed cannot
easily flee. It is difficult to avoid taxation, except by migration, which has many
severe transitional costs. In contrast, it is easy to avoid being hit with the costs
of creditor bail-in; you just withdraw or sell your claim. Consequently,
triggering the bail-in process is likely to generate a capital flight and a sharp
rise in funding costs, whenever the need for large-scale recapitalizations
becomes apparent. Creditors who sense in advance the possibility of a bail-in,
or creditors of institutions with similar asset or regional characteristics will
have a strong incentive to withdraw deposits, sell debt, or hedge their
positions through the short-selling of equity or the purchase of credit
protection at an ever-higher premium disrupting the relevant markets. Such
actions could be damaging and disruptive, both to a single institution and
potentially to wider market confidence. 
It is, of course, true that equity holders and bond holders cannot run in the
same way that depositors can, but financial counterparties can easily do so
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and will do so if they do not immediately see a hesty capital cushion in the
bailed-in bank. If such counterparties flee then equity and bond holders would
certainly follow and in their attempt to do so they would drive asset values
sharply down. This would make the option of raising new money, or rolling
over existing maturing bonds, unattractive or virtually impossible. In such
circumstances, bank credit extension would stop, amplifying the downturn,
lowering asset values and putting the solvency of other banks at risk.
Excluding depositors of all brands from bail-in might reduce the danger of
contagion but would not remove it. In the absence of a fiscal backstop for other
parts of the financial system, if bail-in is triggered before measures have been
taken to buttress the rest of the financial system, a creditor flight from other
banks will be certain, spreading the tremors throughout the financial system,
even if those banks retain sufficient amounts of CoCos and other specially
designed bail-in able debt whose only purpose is to absorb bank losses. 
(iii) Valuations
Triggering the bail-in process will prove unsuccessful if bank losses are
not properly identified in some finite form. The determination of bank losses
including unrealized future losses must be accurately determined in order to
avoid successive rounds of bail-in losses accruing to bank creditors. This
might in fact prove a challenging task. For example, bank losses in the recent
crisis have consistently been underestimated.
Asset valuation is an inexact science and market cyclicality makes this task
even harder.43 In the uncertain conditions of generalized asset value declines,
the new (incoming) accountants, employed by the resolution agency, are likely
to take a bad scenario (or even a worst case one) as their base case for
identifying losses, to be borne by the bailed-in creditors, partly also to
minimize the afore-mentioned danger of underestimation leading to further
calls on creditors. Previously the accountants of the failing bank itself will
have been encouraged (by management) to take a more positive view of its
(going concern) value. Thus, the transition to bail-in is likely to lead to a huge
discontinuity, a massive drop, in published accounting valuations. 
43. E.g., Bank failures during boom conditions, for example resulting from fraud, such as Barings, are
easier to handle with less danger of contagion.
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For the resolved bank, itself a dimmer view of the value of bank assets will
result in a much deeper write-off or conversion haircut and ensuing creditor
losses than the valuation assumptions used by the previous set of auditors would
have necessitated. This could put into question amongst the general public the
existing valuations of other banks, and lead, possibly rapidly, to a contagious
crisis. Moreover, as nobody really knows what creditors would have received in
insolvency the no creditor worse off principle could mean nothing in practice.
Exclusive reliance on creditor bail-in to recapitalize banks could even
result in several rounds of creditor bail-ins even post-resolution. This was the
case with creditor bail-in at the Portuguese Novo Banco, which was the
resulting good bank, from the resolution of the failed Espirito Santo bank.44
But successive bail-in rounds are a recipe to scare investors when market
funding will be needed the most to restore the resolved bank or its successors
to full financial health. bank destroying market confidence in the resulting
good bank post-resolution. 
(iv) Post-bail-in funding
Market confidence in the bailed-in institution would have to be quickly
restored in order to preserve franchise value and repay official liquidity
support (Sommer, 2014). This is mostly dependent on how fast the capital
structure of the requisite bank (or the new bank in the event of a ‘closed’ bank
process) is rebuilt. If the institution has entered into a death spiral with
customers, creditors and depositors fast disappearing, reversing the trend
would doubtlessly prove a task of daunting proportions. 
In fact, the implementers of the bail-in mechanism seem to have
underestimated the dynamics of a bank run ex post, even where creditors face
no potential losses in the astermath of a bailout or a rescue by the resolution
fund, due, presumably, to reputation risks as well as the (irrational) fear of
future risks (Carlson and Rose, 2016). This dynamic is of course much greater
in the case of banks where creditors have already experienced large losses due
to the triggering of bail-in and where experience with subsequent bail-ins
aster the initial haircut is rife (Arnold and Hale, 2016; Whittall, 2016). 
44. E.g., the senior creditors of Novo Bank had to suffer a further bail-in round inspite the steep haircut
applied to junior creditors of the failed bank. See Arnold and Hale (2016) and Whittall (2016). 
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B. Behavioural and other ex ante impact of bail-ins on timely interven-
tion and speed of resolution
Speed of resolution/recapitalization (albeit at the expense of flexibility) is
one of the reasons for the popularity of bail-ins among regulators (Sommer,
2014). The issue of when to trigger the bail-in process, taking also into account
the requirements of early intervention regimes (for example, Title III BRRD), is
a matter of cardinal importance. Identification of the right time and conditions
to trigger the bail-in tool in a process that converts either specially designed or
general bail-inable debt will be one of the most important decisions of any bank
supervisor. If the supervisors trigger bail-in early, then the full measure of
losses may not have been fully revealed, risking further rounds of bail-in. But
if the supervisor determines to use the bail-in tool at a later stage, when the
full scale of losses to be imposed on creditors is revealed, they risk a flight of
general bank creditors.
One of the biggest challenges facing modern resolution regimes is giving
regulators and, to some extent, the troubled institution’s management the right
incentives to act early especially when it comes to tackling problematic assets,
mainly NPLs. However, experience so far has shown that in a scenario where
the banks of a given financial system face a high rate of NPLs, regulators act
faster where there is a possibility of a state backed AMC (Arner et al., 2016). In
contrast, where tackling a large number of NPLs on a systematic basis raises
the possibility of creditor bail-ins, regulators show signs of forbearance. Namely,
the behavioural impact of uncertain outcomes associated with the application
of bail-in regimes seems to be the exact opposite of what was intended by the
new resolution regime: earlier intervention. Naturally, the more delayed the
onset of resolution, the more essential it will be to put more emphasis on an
earlier recovery phase, which may be delayed if bank management does not face
the right incentives (Goodhart and Segoviano, 2015).
3. Building a eurozone amc
As said earlier, a possible solution to the nearly intractable problem of
NPLs in the periphery of the eurozone could be the establishment of a euro-
AMC. The BRRD does not entirely rule out the possibility of injection of public
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funds to a distressed bank, subject to the very strict conditions of articles
37(10), 56, 58 BRRD, and as a last resort. Inevitably, such injection of public
funds would indeed amount to a form of state assistance.45 It is, thus, unclear,
whether a euro-AMC operating on the basis of a public guarantee would
benefit from the exemption.46
On the other hand, AMC transactions with going concern banks could
bypass the BRRD requirements altogether. NPLs could be transferred to the
AMC by banks that have neither entered the resolution or pre-resolution
stage. Sales of NPLs to a euro-AMC would free up capital for new lending,
relieving, to some extent, eurozone’s debt overhang, chiefly observed in
Greece and Italy. But another obstacle would remain: the EU state-aid rules
under article 107 TFEU.47
EU state aid rules have been applied to the EU banking sector with various
degrees of flexibility. A euro-AMC could buy at a specified range of haircuts
bank NPLs that have not already been tackled by country AMCs e.g. outside
of Ireland or Spain. The haircut would not exceed by much any provisions and
write offs the bank has already charged to minimize bank losses. Overall the
objective of the AMC would be to buy the asset at a price that wouldn’t trigger
a requirement for immediate capital injections.48 Any losses incurred by the
AMC if the asset is subsequently sold below acquisition price could be
amortized and covered through (capped) long-term profit-loss arrangements
with the selling bank. 
The impact on bank capital of relevant losses would be amortized and
absorbed in conjunction with other measures currently adopted to boost EU
bank capital, including the adoption of IFRS 9.49 Moreover, (capped) long-term
profit loss arrangements would, first, encourage banks to pursue strategic
defaulters. The higher the recovery rate the lower the possibility of future
loss. Secondly such arrangements open the possibility of banks sharing in any
profit derived from higher recovery values. 
45. Art 2(1)(28), BRRD.
46. For forms of ex ante burden sharing Goodhart and Schoenmaker (2009). 
47. Rec 57, Rec 41, BRRD.
48. See also Mesnard et al.(2016, p. 6).
49. EBA Press Release, “EBA provides its views on the implementation of IFRS 9 and its impact on banks
across the EU”, 10 Nov. 2016.
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A key difference between national AMCs working this way and a possible
euro-AMC would be that residual investor losses on liquidation beyond a pre-
determined level could be covered by an ESM guarantee. Without said
guarantee it would be impossible to attract in sufficient quantities of private
investment for a euro-AMC. Admittedly, any direct fiscal transfers from
member states to a euro-AMC would fall foul of Art. 125 of the TFEU. But
would the same be the case if the scheme only enjoyed an ESM guarantee?
While the legal questions may not be answered with certainty from the
outset, arguably, if structured properly, the fiscal transfer element in the
building up of the euro-AMC would be much less pronounced, notwithstanding
the need to change the ESM statute in to render such a guarantee. First, while
the AMC could operate for as long as its shareholders desire and at a minimum
until all (capped) profit and loss agreements are settled, there is no reason for
the ESM guarantee to last for so long. The AMC and the ESM could review
both the necessity of the guarantee and its terms on an annual, bi-annual, or
five-year basis, making it clear that the guarantee would be withdrawn as soon
as the AMC shows profitability ratios against overall assets that exceed a pre-
agreed threshold. Namely, the guarantee would be mostly utilized to inspire
confidence to private investors for the first few years of the AMC’s operation,
but, in practice, it may never be used. Secondly, the ESM itself is more or less
a sovereign fund whose direct state funding of 80 billion Euro paid up capital
is less than 16% of all funding available, with the rest of its lending merely
guaranteed by members’ budgets. If the ESM guarantee was to be offered on
commercial terms50 - enabling thus the AMC to exclusively attract private
investment, any charge of fiscal burden sharing would seem much less
convincing, at least, until the guarantee materialized, if ever. This would
especially be the case if selling banks had (capped) long-term profit-loss
agreements with the AMC. Again such burden sharing and attendant financial
engineering has been successfully employed in a variety of NPL transfer
schemes during the Asian crisis of late 1990s,51 and more recently by the US
TARP, which was wound down with a profit of 15 billion USD.52
50. For the costs of ESM lending to its members see ESM 2015 Annual Report (p.51)  
51. Arner et al. (2016).
52. Jonathan Weisman, “U.S. Declares Bank and Auto Bailouts Over, and Profitable” NYTimes 19 Dec. 2014
86_EUROPEAN ECONOMY 2016.2
ARTICLES
However, philosophical problems relating to moral hazard and Too-Big-To-
Fail would remain. Thus, we suggest that institutions selling NPLs to the AMC-
other distressed financial instruments ought to be excluded from the scheme -
could be subject to a structural conditionality similar to that undertaken by the
UK government in the context of the RBS rescue.53 Such conditionality would
tackle fears of reinforcing big banks and the TBTF subsidy. It could also be a
sufficient measure to conform with the EU state aid framework and open up
Eurozone banking markets to new contestants/entrants. 
Another argument in favour of a euro-AMC is that it could give a considerable
boost to Eurozone’s fragmented market for NPLs that is also quite illiquid. Given
the yield appetite of institutional investors in today’s debt markets, a euro-AMC
could act as a catalyst for the Eurozone market for distressed banking debts.
Given ability to safely disseminate due diligence reports through FinTech
platforms, which can hold vast amounts of data, the presence of a big player
could attract considerable private investor interest. A final benefit is that a euro-
AMC could, indirectly, relieve current pressure placed on the ECB in the context
of sometimes controversial bank bond purchase programmes.
4. conclusion
The desire to find an effective way to replace the public subsidy for TBTF
banks and the unpopular bail-out process is entirely understandable. But, there
is a danger of over-reliance on bail-ins when the risk is not idiosyncratic.
Namely, the bail-in process could be used successfully to recapitalize domestic
SIFIs, but only if the institution has failed due to its own actions and omissions
(e.g., fraud). On the other hand, where the banks of a country or a region face a
systemic problem, e.g., they carry a high number of bad assets, bail-ins can
trigger a bank funder panic both ex ante and ex post. As the history of financial
crises has made clear, imposing haircuts on general bank creditors during a
systemic event is a sure way to accelerate the panic. In fact, contagion: a flight
of creditors from other institutions may be uncontainable. Achieving the goal
53. EU Commission Press release, “State aid: Commission approves amendments to restructuring plan
of Royal Bank of Scotland”, 9 April 2014.
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of making private institutions responsible for their actions would be the best
policy in an ideal world where financial ‘polluters’ would be held responsible
for their actions. But, in practice, it might prove an unattainable goal. 
To clean up bank balance sheets without pushing Eurozone banks into bail-
centred recapitalisations, necessitated by the present dearth of investor
interest in their equity, we have considered the possibility of a euro-AMC.
While such a vehicle could act as a catalyst for attracting new private entrants
and boosting liquidity in the euro-market for distressed bank debt, it would
certainly face important legal obstacles. Yet long-term profit-loss sharing
arrangements could bring the operation of a euro-AMC as close to a
commercial standing as possible. A viable euro-AMC would require some form
of a fiscal backstop. This could possibly be offered in the form of an ESM
guarantee. Cleaning up bank balance sheets from NPLs would free up capital
for new lending which would boost economic recovery in the periphery of the
Eurozone. Historical experience has shown that similar experiments have been
largely successful, chiefly in Asia and more recently in the USA. 
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